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The Polish Military in the Twentieth Century
by Dr Stephen R Bawer.1
From the battles which led to the re-birth of Poland after World War
One until the brief but bloody struggle against the German invaders in
19 39, the Poles developed a reputation as fearless, resolute fighters.
Perhaps the best-known incident came in September 1939 when,
according to Nazi propaganda, two squadrons of Polish cavalry made a
futile and costly charge against German tanks. This account, still widely
accepted by historians, and occasionally promoted by Poles as evidence
of their bravery, is only partially correct. The two squadrons, having
successfully completed an attack against a German infantry battalion,
were they themselves suddenly attacked by two armoured cars. The
cavalry lost several dozen men before retreating into the cover of a
nearby thicket. 1
Yet, Polish military traditions reflect more than just a pride in the
history of the Polish armed forces. The political and social mission of
the Arm~· has hcen equally significant.
Following the re-establishment of Poland in 1919, the Polish Armv,
representing commuml and national interests, emerged as a major
instrument of national unity. Transcending \'ested interests, it enjoyed
considerable social influence and was able to resist extensive P<'litical
controls. During the Pilsudski regime, the Army's formal links with the
state transformed it into a device for the manipulation nf the government, which eventually led the Army to adopt political objectives.
Following Pilsudski's death, military figures assumed control of the
Polish state apparatus in the so-called 'Government of the Colonels'.
The 1\rm~··s political influence between thC' wars was matcheJ h\· its
2
size which grew from 266,000 men in 1923 to 350,000 by 1935
During the upheavals of 1980-81, the military was able to draw upon
this rich tradition of social and political influence and once again
played a decisive role in Polish political history.
Although Poland collapsed in 19 3 9, the Polish military diJ not
disappear. Despite the loss of thousands of Polish servicemen, including
3
the bulk of the officer corps in the massacre at Soviet-occupied Katyn,
organised resistance persisted. Thousands of Poles fled to the Soviet
Union, where they joined the Polish armies being built up hy the
Soviets. These were dominated and commanded by Russians, ,,·ho
A specialist on Soviet and East European affairs, Dr Stephen R Bowers has
written sl!'veral articles on the Warsaw Pact military. lie is presently employed as
an intdligencl!' 1nalyst specialising in Eastern Europe. Dr Bowers' article 'The
Political Evolution of Intelligence' appeared in AQ Vol I H No 2 (April 1984 ).
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held one third of the offi~rs' commissions in these new armies. Others
chose to stay in Poland and fight with the Home Army, the noncommunist and largest of the anti-Nazi forces. Within the Home Army,
however, there was a group of Communist partisans, known as the
People's Army. Many of these partisans were veterans of the Spanish
Civil War and later joined the two Soviet-organised armies which were
to form the postwar Communist Polish Army. Finally, many Poles
joined the British forces in the Middle East: still others distinguished
themselves as pilots in the Royal Air Force. Soviet political pressures
meant that most Poles who fought in the West were later denied
commissions in the postwar Polish forces. Official policy was to recruit
officers from the supposedly more sympathetic worker and peasant
classes. 4
The Pnlish forces as organised by the Soviets in 1943, formed the
basis of the army of communist Poland. With the additipn of the communist faction of the llome Army, the new Polish Army was, in theory,
a cimtplete dcparrurc from the precommunist Polish military model.
It reflected Soviet concepts of military organisation, leadership and
discipline. Ouring and after the war, the leadership of the Polish
military was screened lw the Soviets, :tnd Soviet military advisors and
officers controlled the training and direction of the new army. Within
several years, most of those who had served in the old Polish Army whether as officers or as enlisted personnel - were dismissed. By 197 3
only 2% of Polish officers had any pre-war military experience. 5
Soviet domination of the Polish Army from 1945-5 5 was symbolised
by Konstanty Rokossowski, a Polish-born Soviet citizen and fonner
Soviet Vice-Minister of Defence. In 1949 he replaced the Polish
nationalist Wla.dyslaw Gomulka on the Central Committee of the Polish
United Workers' Party and also became Polish Mit1istcr of Defence, ;1
position that he held until 1956. 6 Rokossowski's control was supplemented by hundreds of Soviet advisors to ensure that Polish military
organisation, training, doctrine, tactics and even uniforms conformed to
the Soviet model. Soviet officers assumed control over much of the
Polish Army and the Chief of the Polish General Staff: the Commander
of the Ground Forces, the heads of all service branches, and the commanders of all of Poland's military districts \vere :til Soviets. During
these years the Polish Army, once a symbol of Polish nationalism.
became an extra-national force directly subordinate to Soviet lli~h
Command. 7
The upheavals of 1956 ended this situation. With the Poznan riots of
june 1956, the Polish forces demonstrated that, in the post-Stalin cr~.
it was. no longer a reliable prop for an ineffective and increasingly
unpopular regime. In Poznan itself, regular army units refused to fire ott
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strikers. With heightened tension between Poland and the lJSSR, and
internal divisions within the army between Polish nationalists and
Soviet loyalists, the Army was completely neutralised and confined to
barracks.
As Soviet pressure on the reformist Polish leadership mounted, a
newly-formed Committee for the Defence of Warsaw or!!anised l'orces
for combat with approaching Soviet troops. Khrushchev's retreat,
virll'ed as a result of the Poles' willingness to fight, led to G{>mulka's
return to power.
The events of 1956 also gave the Polish military relativt' autonom\·.
The price of that autonomy, however, was absolute conformit~·· to the
Warsaw Pact, integrated commands, common training and equipment,
and rigid political surveillance and control. Ne\·enheless. in ;>.;mTmher
1956, Marshal Rokosswoski, who had just been denied h>litburo
membership, the leading Soviet military ad\·isors and other hi!(h ranking
Sodets in Pol:tnd accepted decorations for their services to Poland and
quietly boarded a plane to the L'SSR. At the same time. Gomulka led a
Polish delc!(ation to Moscow where he secured a Soviet agreement f(lr
mutual friendship, a continued Polish-Soviet military alliance -including the stationing of Srl\'iet troops in P<,land - and, most
important, complete internal S<)\'ereignty for Poland 8 Through this
agreement and the tense confrontations of 1956, the P<'lc~ regained
control not only of their political destiny but also of their militarY
organisation.
With Coniulka's renewed emphasis on Polish nati0nalism it \\as
inevitable that the militarv should become the focus for those
determined to 'de·Suvietisc' Polish public life. The remm·al of
Rokossowski and his Sm·ict colleagues was follol\ed by the ;~ppt>int·
tncnt of 'native' communists who, like Gomulka. had suffered durin!'
the Stalinist era in Poland. General Marian SpHhalski. a 1·ictim uf the
purges, rephced Rokossowski as defence minister. General Janusz
Zarzychi, another purge victim, became chief of the .\bin Political
Administration. Tradition;tl uniforms and militar\· songs \ITrc rcintmduced, and Poland secured a status-of-forces agreement with the l'SSR
that limited Soviet military activities in Poland and gave Poles the
theoretical right to try Soviet soldiers in Polish courts for crimes cpmrnittcd white' off-duty. 9
'De·Sovietisation', however, had its limits and did not invoh-e a
rupture of Poland's tics with the Soviet Union or the Warsa"· Pan.
West German rearmament undnubtedlv reminded Poland of her
ultimate dependence upon the l!SSR in- the face of a West German\
that maintained her claim to the Oder·Neissc lands.
Despite these efforts to return to the milit;u~· the rok and respon·
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sibilities of the pre-wa.r years, the prestige of the Polish Army remained
low Its a result of Soviet domination·. A 1958 sutVey of Warsaw youths
showed that the military, once the pride of Poland, rated behind office
workers and had fallen to 21st place in social status. By 1975 it has
recovered much of its lost glamour, rising to eleventh place in a similar
sutVey, but it wa.s still rated lower in Poland than in most other nations
sutVcyed in the same study. 10 It is not surprising that enlistments had
begun to decline, a problem that once again became acute in the
1980's.
The key to the post-1956 effort to restore prestige was the removal
of heavy-handed Soviet control and the weakening of party control
over the military. The fall of Rokossowski and the Soviet 'advisors'
was only the first step in a process which included the abolition of the
militnry's communist youth organisation, a reduction in the authority
of military political officers and the removal of company-level political
officers.
This reduction of petty influence within the military allowed the
professional officer corps to reassert itself. The values of military
professionalism, rather than ideological criteria, were re-established.
The officer corps' rediscovery of its prerogatives w:ts accompanied by
the establishment in 1957 of a Military Council in the Ministry of
National Defence. Here, department and service chiefs could exmaine
their professional problems without the presence of Party representatives. 11
The diminution of party control did not, however, lead to a politically independent Polish Army. In fact, the party subsequently
reclaimed much of what it had lost during the turbulent mid-l95tfs.
Today, political control over the military is achieved through sevrra I
chains of authority and political oq;anisations operating from the
General Staff down to company level.
The primary instrument for political SUIVeillance has been the Main
Political Administration (MI' A) of the General Staff, in both the Party
Secretariat and in the Ministry of National Defence. The MP A is responsible for the political officers which are assigned to all field
commanders, and organises party cells in all units. Through the .\lilitary
Youth Organisation, it directs the political education of enlisted
personnel. Throtigh the Administrative Department, the Party Secretariat uses the Military Security. SetVice as a military political police
force to guard against dissident activities in the armed forces.
The Soviet Union has also .reclaimed much of what it had lost after
19 56. Not only are certain key Polish military appointments once again
reserved for Soviet officers, but various specialised security services arc
under direct KGB control. Furthermore, promotion above the rank of
434
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colonel is limited to those officers who have been trained at Soviet
academics.
The regeneration of political authority within the military has been
supported by consistent demands for an intensification of partyideological work in the armed forces. The tone of this effort was set at
an ideological conference for leading military cadres held in 1978. The
Conference theme reflected the leadership's understanding of the role
of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party), asserting that the army
would 'help to create socialist Poland ... under the leadership of the
party . . . ' In sharp contrast with the independent spirit of 19 56,
General Wlodimierz Sawczuk, head of the MP A demanded that cadres
'increase the militancy of party-political work in the Polish armed
forces' and General Jaruzelski outlined specific political-educational
tasks for accomplishing that objective.
In 1984, Poland's .\Hnister of Defence, General Florian Siwicki,
further elaborated on this theme. He declared that the 'party is and
always has been the leading, guiding, and vanguard force in the armed
forces'. Siwicki explained that party organisations within the military
deserved credit for stimulating greater performance and a higher level of
combat-readiness. 1 3 By the 1970's the Polish civil defence effort discussed bclo\v - provided a model for the trans! a tion into policy of
the military's commitment to an ideologically based 'intensification of
cooperation' between party and military. 14
Twenty years after the 'renationalisation' of the Polish Army, it
became clear that the military's idea of nationalism was not that of the
traditional Pole but rather an 'enlightened' Marxist-Leninist version of
an 'international patriotism'. The military's expression of nationalism
was found in a finn alliance with the Soviet Union and an exaltation of
those event~ in Polish history that reflected the glories of socialism.
the USSR, and Poland's struggles against Western nations.
It is not surprising that Party domination of a more genuinely
professional m:ilitary has continued nor that the army's status as an
institution reflective of Polish pride and popular patriotism has not
been regained. The leadership of the armed forces seems to have u ncritically accepted Soviet military science and its mvn position and obligations within the Warsaw Pact. While the blatant expressions of direct
Soviet manipulation have been eliminated, the military remains a
reliable instrument of communist rule in Poland.
The military's political role is enhanced by an organisational
Structure described by Polish authorities as both logical and functionaL
The leadership's views on this matter were elaborated in a discussion in
Zolnierz Polski in 1981 which stated that 'an army is a structure which
is organised clearly, logically, and, above all, functionally.' 15 The Polish
435
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armed forces are therefore divided into four branches: ground forces
and the navy.
The ground forces' primary mission is to prevent enemy forces from
invading Poland and seizing and holding specific objectives. The regime
boasts of the ground forces' great firepower, manocuverahility, and
airborne capabilities. The Ground forces consist of the following
combat arms; mechanised forces, tank forces- the main striking arm airborne assault units, missile forces - the m:tin firepower element arti11ery, anti-aircraft defence, shore defence, combat engineers,
chemical troops, signal troops, transportation units and tactical air
forces. 16
There arc approximately 220,000 men in the ground forces, 75%
of whom arc conscripts. They are divided into five armoured, one
airborne, one assault landing and eight motoriscd rifle divisions. The
latter arc composed of three motoriscd rifle· regiments, one tank or
armoured regiment, one arti11t'ry regiment, and numerous support
clements. The assault landing division is organised and equipped to
crn5s rivers and streams under combat conditions and to conduct
amphibious assaults.
The airborne divisi(ln, one of Poland's elite units, is fully capable of
airborne assault operations and the well-equipped artillery divisions
boast a variety of howitzers, anti-tank missiles, multiple rocket
launchers, and ~elf-propelled guns. The armoured divisions use Soviet
T-54/55 medium tanks armed with night-vision devices and gun
stabilisers. They can therefore fire accurHely on the move in dar or
night. The di\'isions facing west arc at 85-90% of full Strength; those
facing cast at no more than 30%. 17
The Air and National Air Defence rorces - a combined force of
88,000 men with over 700 aircraft - is the largest Warsaw Pact air
force apart from that of the Soviet Union. Established in 1944 as the
Soviet Sixth Air Army, the Polish Air Force has suffered from being a
Soviet creation since hirth. Its first operations were conducted under
Soviet command with Soviet and Polish personnel, and it continued to
function as a Soviet force even after the war. It was not until 1956 that
the air force- along with the army- gained some indcpcndencc. 18
The principal clements of the air force arc the fighter air forc-e, to
provide protrction for friendly forces against enemy air attacks; the
att:tck·fightcr air force, to support mechanised and airborne assault
forces; the fighter·bombcr air force, to strike deep inside enemy lines:
the reconnaissance air force, transport air force and, finally, rhc
auxiliary air force, providing communication, transportation fnr
wounded, and other essential support scrviccs. 19
Established in 1962, the National Air Defence rortes are one of the
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youngest branches of the Polish Air Force. They are known as the
'five-minute armies' because of their quick response capabilities. Given
their broad geographic responsibilities - they cover all important
Polish industrial, political-administrative, and transportation centres and their obligation to offer immediate protection for the country's
most likely fixed targets, it is not surprising that the Air Defence F orccs
arc well-armed. They presently employ ten regiments made up largely
of Soviet MiG-2 3 Flogger B interceptors already used by Russia's
Middle Eastern allies. Polish military spokesmen, of course, ignore the
delay in their receipt of the latest equipment, insisting that the Air
Defence Forces are equipped with the 'most modern pursuit planes'.
There arc also nine SAM regiments in fifty sites to defend important
targets against enemy attack. 20
Three basic units are used by the National Air Defence Forces:
rocket and artillery units, an air force, and radio engineers. In addition,
there are several support units such as communication, chcm ical,
supply, engineering, and other service detachmenrs. 21
The Polish Navy became a legal entity in July 19·+4 receiving its first
ship, the salvaged launch 'Korsarz', in summer 1945. The military
weekly Zol11ierz Polski speaks of the difficulties of those early years
when the 'Polish ships and crews who had become famous in battling
the Nazi Kriegsmarine were still in the West . . . ' Furthermore,
according to· the Journal, 'it was not easy to get them back' nor \\'ere
the Western navies in which they had served, most notably Sweden
and Great Britain, eager to return the ships. In fact, Znlnier: Polski
charges, it was not until six years after the \\'ar that the submarine
'Wilk' was returned and by then it was 'fit only for scrap metal'. 2 2
Serious efforts to develop the Polish Navy began in ,\larch 19+6,
ll'hcn the lJSSR deli\·ered nine trawlers, 12 small submarine motor
boats, and two torpedo cutters to the naval base at Gdynia. Repair
bases were expanded and training of naval specialists began. ,\hjor
improvements followed in the 1950's when the Polish Navy received
submarines, large submarine motor boats, new destroyers and torpedo
CUtters. Over the next decade, rocket ships purchased from the L'SSR
and the present generation of Polish ships were added to the countrv's
~rowing navy. The Polish Navy now includes groups of surface and
submarine craft, about 60 naval aircraft, various coastal units equipped
with cruise missiles and about 1,000 marines, numerous engineers,
technicians, hydrographic, supply, and medical specialists 2 3
No Polish ship is designed for wartime operations outside the Baltic.
ihus, while the navy may be an effective defensive force, it lacks the
npability for major naval actions. Discussions of Polish naval missions
- With the exception of Polish submarines, which are supposed to
\\·.
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'conduct combat operations in distant area'- generally focus o~ purely
defensive tasks such as coastal protection, combating enemy
amphibious assaults, and anti-subm~rine warfare. 24
The modern Polish Armed Forces, therefore, are a product of
Soviet training and political indoctrination. They are vastly different
from the patriotic, nntionalistic pre-war military establishment. There is
a new, internationalist version of Polish patriotism among the officer
corps. An extensive network of political controls over the military
discourages dissident political doctrines.
This difference is also a result of the rleclining popularity of the
military - a condition which has become the focus of much public
discu~sion in the Polish media - and the popular perceptions of the
army as a Soviet tool. The military is therefore less attractive to
traditional Polish nationalists and those inclined towards anti-Russian
sentiments.
But it is the attitude of the milit:try that has changed rather than its
role, which remains that of a 'national saviour'. The Polish Army is
still an institution with both militrtty and political responsibilities.
The difference is that the Army now uses Marxism- Leninism and the
Warsaw Pact to save Poland from 'chaos' instead of foreign domination
and the loss of national sovereignty.
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